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SMITH, Chief Judge 
Ronald Repak was convicted of two counts of 
Hobbs Act extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, 
and two counts of federal program bribery, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 666.  Repak appeals his conviction and 
sentence on those counts.  For the reasons stated below, 





This is a public corruption case coming out of 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania.  The defendant, Ronald Repak, 
was the Executive Director of the Johnstown 
Redevelopment Authority (“JRA”), which receives 
federal and state funding to assist in economic 
development for the City of Johnstown.  A voluntary 
Board of Directors governs the JRA.  To promote 
economic development in Johnstown, the JRA’s Board of 
Directors awards contracts to remediate industrial 
proprieties and issues grants to attract companies to 
Johnstown.   
While the JRA’s Board of Directors ultimately 
confers contracts and grants, the JRA’s Executive 
Director, who runs the day-to-day operations of the 
organization, makes recommendations to the Board as to 
which contractors should receive those contracts and 
grants.  The JRA’s Board of Directors “relied on the 
director to keep [them] informed as to what was going 
on.”  JA263.  As one JRA Board member testified, “95 
percent of what any board member [knew] in most . . . 
situations . . . w[as] told [to them] by the director.”  
JA262–63.  In short, the Executive Director plays a vital 
role in the process of selecting who receives JRA 
contracts and grants.   
Repak was the Executive Director from November 
1977 to February 2013.  His assistant was Debbie Walter.  
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With Walter’s help, Repak solicited a number of items 
from contractors who had been awarded contract work by 
the JRA during his time as Executive Director.1  Repak’s 
solicitations included requests for concert tickets, 
sporting event tickets, and golf outings.  JRA contractors 
acquiesced in Repak’s solicitations because “if [they] 
didn’t, [they] felt that [they] would lose work.”  JA284.  
As one contractor testified, Repak “would sometimes . . . 
provide some innuendos like, ‘Hey, I’m reviewing some 
invoice here of yours,’ which [was] usually followed up 
with some type of request.  Or sometimes, [he would 
say,] ‘Well, I can get someone else to do the work.’”  Id.; 
see also JA301 (“Mr. Repak provided a lot of, I said 
innuendos, subtle things through conversations.  And 
then it would always be followed in a short period of 
time by either an instruction or request. . . .  [W]ith him[,] 
[instructions and requests] were the same thing.”).   
Of particular importance in this appeal are two 
items that Repak received from JRA contractors but that 
were unassociated with any JRA project: a new roof on 
his house and excavating services for his son’s gym.  The 
Government also charged Repak with receipt of 
Pittsburgh Steelers tickets from another contractor, 
                                                 
1 Most of Repak’s solicitations were uncharged conduct 
admitted at trial through the District Court’s contested 
ruling under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which is addressed below. 
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Kimball & Co.  The jury, however, acquitted Repak on 
the counts related to receipt of the Steelers tickets.  For 
that reason, we discuss only the receipt of the roof and 
excavating services in detail. 
In 2009, JRA contractor EADS Group (“EADS”) 
replaced the roof on Repak’s home at no cost to Repak.  
While Repak and several EADS employees were 
together, Repak overheard an EADS employee, Stephen 
Sewalk, discussing his past roofing business.  Repak then 
asked Sewalk to take a look at the roof on his home.  At 
that time, EADS did significant business with the JRA.  
Based on Repak’s past solicitations for tickets and other 
items, Sewalk stated that he “inward[ly] sigh[ed]” 
following Repak’s roof request and thought “here we go 
[again].”  JA286.  Although Sewalk initially tried to 
ignore Repak’s request, Sewalk “knew it wasn’t going to 
go away” after Repak made the request again several 
months later.  Id.  Sewalk then went to look at Repak’s 
roof but testified at trial that he did not give Repak a 
quote for work on the roof.  Rather, after Sewalk spoke 
with EADS’s CEO, EADS “figured [the roof] was going 
to be another . . . favor” and informed Repak that it 
would cover the cost of replacing his roof.  JA287.  
Sewalk testified that, although Repak offered to pay for 
the roof at one point, Repak also told him to “bury [the 
roofing expenses] in an invoice” to the JRA.  JA288.  
EADS ultimately replaced the roof at a cost of $3,000 to 
$4,000.  Instead of concealing those expenses in JRA 
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invoices as Repak instructed, EADS simply bore the cost 
of replacing the roof.  When asked at trial why EADS did 
this for Repak, Sewalk responded that EADS replaced 
the roof simply so that EADS could “maintain the 
workload” with the JRA.  Id.; see also JA289 (“[W]e 
wanted to keep people employed and do our work.  So I 
figured if we told [Repak] no that we weren’t going to be 
working there much longer.”). 
Also in 2009, a JRA contractor performed 
excavating services at a gym owned by Repak’s son.  
Neither Repak nor his family paid for it.  Repak initially 
asked another JRA contractor to do the excavating work, 
but, after Repak told the contractor to bury $5,000 out of 
the $6,000 excavating price quoted in a JRA invoice, the 
contractor turned him down and refused to work for the 
JRA again.  As that contractor put it, “I just discussed it 
with my wife and kids, . . . and we just decided it would 
be better just to walk away [than continue to work for the 
JRA and Repak].”  JA359. 
Repak then enlisted another JRA contractor, L&M 
Excavating Company (“L&M”), to do the work.  Repak 
instructed L&M to demolish two abandoned homes and 
level lots adjoining his son’s gym and then to spread 
gravel on the leveled area for parking.  This work cost 
L&M $17,500.  After completing the requested work, an 
L&M employee, Rick McNulty, asked Repak whom 
L&M should invoice for the work.  Repak told McNulty 
to “just bury [the $17,500] in invoices” to the JRA and 
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did not offer to pay for L&M’s services.  JA325–26.  At 
that time, sixty percent of L&M’s business came from 
the JRA.  Yet, rather than follow Repak’s instruction to 
submit fraudulent invoices, L&M assumed the $17,500 
cost to level and gravel the property near the gym.  When 
asked why L&M did this, McNulty explained that 
providing these gratuitous services to Repak was just 
“part of doing business with the [JRA] and Mr. Repak.”  
JA311. 
As members became suspicious of Repak’s 
dealings with JRA contractors, the JRA’s Board of 
Directors implemented policies to control gratuities and 
expenditures.  The gratuities policy prohibited JRA 
contractors from offering any gratuity to any JRA 
employee and prohibited JRA employees from accepting 
the same.  The expenditures policy required the approval 
of the JRA’s Board of Directors for all JRA expenditures 
over $500.  At trial, JRA contractors expressed the relief 
they felt following enactment of the gratuities policy.  
One JRA contractor testified, “I was relieved [because] 
. . . it gave me my ammunition to say no, I guess.  I 
didn’t have to continue doing this.”  JA290.  Echoing the 
sentiment behind the JRA policies, another contractor 
opined, “It had to stop.  It was getting to the point that 
[Repak] was like one power running everything in the 
city of Johnstown and if . . . this wasn’t the way you 
would choose to do business, you wouldn’t do business 




A grand jury returned a six-count indictment 
against Repak arising out of his actions as the Executive 
Director of the JRA.  The six counts related to three 
underlying factual circumstances: Counts 1 and 2 
pertained to Repak’s receipt of Pittsburgh Steelers tickets 
from Kimball & Co.; Counts 3 and 4 dealt with the 
installation of a new roof on Repak’s house by EADS; 
and Counts 5 and 6 related to the excavation services 
performed by L&M at Repak’s son’s gym.  Counts 1, 3, 
and 5 charged Repak with violations of the Hobbs Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), for knowing obstruction, delay, or 
effect on commerce “by extortion” through the 
solicitation and receipt of goods and services, “which 
were not due him or his office, and to which he was not 
entitled, . . . in exchange for [his] official action and 
influence as the Executive Director of the [JRA] to 
facilitate the award of [JRA] contracting work.”  JA55, 
JA57, JA59.  Counts 2, 4, and 6 charged Repak with 
violations of the federal program bribery statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), alleging that he “did corruptly 
solicit, demand, accept, and agree to accept something of 
value, intending to be influenced and rewarded in 
connection with [JRA business],” specifically that Repak 
respectively “solicited and obtained” goods and services 
“in exchange for his official actions and influence as the 
Executive Director of the [JRA].”  JA56, JA58, JA60.   
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Before trial, the District Court decided two 
motions in limine filed by the Government that were 
relevant to Repak’s appeal.  First, Repak challenged the 
admission of evidence of solicitations and items he 
received beyond those items charged in the indictment 
(“other-acts evidence”).  The District Court allowed the 
Government to introduce the other-acts evidence, 
determining that the evidence was admissible to prove 
Repak’s mental state for the charged offenses.  See 
United States v. Repak, No. 3-14-cr-00001, 2015 WL 
4108309, at *4–6 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2015).  Second, 
Repak challenged the admission of evidence of an affair 
he had with Walter under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.  Following briefing on the issue, the District 
Court permitted admission of the affair evidence, 
concluding the affair was relevant to Repak’s mental 
state and would further assist the jury in assessing 
Walter’s credibility when she testified.  See JA11–17.   
At trial, the parties jointly proposed and, with 
limited exceptions not relevant here, agreed to jury 
instructions.  The District Court later read those 
instructions to the jury.  The instructions informed the 
jury of the elements of the two charged offenses—
violations of the Hobbs Act and the federal program 
bribery statute.  The elements of a Hobbs Act violation 
were defined as follows:  
First, that the defendant took from [the three 
JRA contractors] the property described in 
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Counts 1, 3, and 5.  Second, that the 
defendant did so knowingly and willfully by 
extortion under color of official right.  
Third, that as a result of defendant’s actions 
interstate commerce was obstructed, 
delayed, or affected.   
JA656.  The elements of federal program bribery were 
defined as:  
First, that at the time alleged in the 
indictment defendant was an agent of the 
[JRA].  Second, that the [JRA] received 
federal benefits in excess of $10,000 in a 
one-year period.  Third, that defendant 
solicited and accepted something of value 
from [the three JRA contractors].  Fourth, 
that defendant acted corruptly with the intent 
to be influenced or rewarded in connection 
with the business and transactions of the 
[JRA]. 
JA660–61.  Repak’s main defense to the charges at trial 
was that he lacked the requisite mental state in accepting 
any items to influence the awarding of JRA contracts.   
The jury convicted Repak on Counts 3 through 6, 
the Hobbs Act and federal program bribery charges 
involving the roof on Repak’s house and the excavating 
services for his son’s gym.  The District Court sentenced 
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Repak to 42 months of incarceration on each count of 
conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently.  The 
District Court also ordered Repak to pay restitution to 
EADS in the amount of $3,500 and to L&M in the 
amount of $15,000.  Repak timely appealed his judgment 
of conviction and sentence.2   
III 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 because this case involves 
an offense against the laws of the United States.  We 
have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
On appeal, Repak raises six arguments related to 
the District Court’s evidentiary rulings, the jury 
instructions, the sufficiency of trial evidence, and the 
prosecutor’s conduct during closing arguments.  We 
conclude that none are meritorious. 
A 
Repak’s first contention is that, under Rule 404(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the District Court 
improperly admitted evidence of his solicitations of items 
from JRA contractors beyond those charged in the 
                                                 
2 While Repak’s notice of appeal identifies his sentence 
as being appealed, he raises no argument related to the 




indictment.  We review the District Court’s evidentiary 
ruling for abuse of discretion, e.g. United States v. 
Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 352 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 
United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 213–14 (3d Cir. 
2009)), but also “exercise plenary review . . . to the 
extent [the rulings] are based on a legal interpretation of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence,” Complaint of 
Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
Rule 404(b)(1) states: “Evidence of a crime, 
wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s 
character in order to show that on a particular occasion 
the person acted in accordance with the character.”  Fed. 
R. Evid. 404(b)(1).  While generally excluding evidence 
of an individual’s “other acts” to show that individual’s 
propensity to behave in a certain manner, Rule 404(b)(2) 
permits admission of other-acts evidence “for another 
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident.”  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
“Rule 404(b) is a rule of general exclusion . . . .”  
United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 
2014); see also United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 
291 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Rule 404(b) is generally a rule of 
exclusion.”).  That is, “Rule 404(b) directs that evidence 
of prior bad acts be excluded—unless the proponent can 
demonstrate that the evidence is admissible for a non-
propensity purpose.”  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276.  We 
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clarified in Caldwell that this Court’s past description of 
Rule 404(b) as “inclusionary,” see, e.g., United States v. 
Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2003), referred to Rule 
404(b)(2)’s language allowing other-acts evidence to be 
used for any purpose other than to show propensity, Fed. 
R. Evid. 404(b)(2).  See Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276.  That 
is, our prior reference to Rule 404(b) as inclusionary 
“merely reiterate[d] the drafters’ decision to not restrict 
the non-propensity uses of evidence.”  Id.  We used that 
language because, prior to Rule 404(b), the 
corresponding common law rule for other-acts evidence 
limited the uses of such evidence.  See United States v. 
Green, 617 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2010).  Rule 404(b) 
altered the common law rule with “inclusionary” 
language, allowing the proponent of other-acts evidence 
to identify any non-propensity purpose and no longer 
requiring the proponent “to pigeonhole his evidence into 
one of the established common-law exceptions, on pain 
of exclusion.”  Id.  In sum, Rule 404(b) is a rule of 
exclusion, meaning that it excludes evidence unless the 
proponent can demonstrate its admissibility, but it is also 
“inclusive” in that it does not limit the non-propensity 
purposes for which evidence can be admitted.   
Because Rule 404(b) is a rule of general exclusion, 
the party seeking to admit other-acts evidence has “the 
burden of demonstrating [the evidence’s] applicability.”  
Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276.  Admissibility under Rule 
404(b) requires the satisfaction of four distinct steps: (1) 
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the other-acts evidence must be proffered for a non-
propensity purpose; (2) that evidence must be relevant to 
the identified non-propensity purpose; (3) its probative 
value must not be substantially outweighed by its 
potential for causing unfair prejudice to the defendant; 
and (4) if requested, the other-acts evidence must be 
accompanied by a limiting instruction.  See Huddleston v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988); Caldwell, 760 
F.3d at 277–78. 
The Government here sought to introduce evidence 
of Repak’s “business relationships with vendors of the 
JRA, which specifically include[d] instances of other 
uncharged acts of solicitations by Mr. Repak to JRA 
vendors, including but not limited to” Kimball & Co., 
EADS, and L&M.  JA123.  Without further explanation, 
the Government contended in its motion in limine that 
Repak’s “prior course of conduct and business 
dealings/relationship with the named entities, including 
previous solicitations, [was] extremely relevant and 
[would] go directly to prove” Repak’s “knowledge” and 
“corrupt intent.”  JA125–26.  The prosecution also 
argued that the uncharged acts of solicitation were 
admissible under Rule 404(b) as “background” evidence 
to “complete[] the story” and provide “context.”  JA127–
29.   
The District Court permitted introduction of the 




[T]he Court finds that the Rule 404(b) 
evidence that the Government intends to 
introduce is admissible. . . .  Defendant’s 
business dealings with the various vendors, 
including other instances of solicitations that 
were not charged in the indictment in this 
case, are relevant to showing a necessary 
element of the crimes charged in this case.  
Specifically, these business dealings and 
other solicitations will be used by the 
Government to establish Defendant’s 
knowledge as to the charges of extortion 
under color of official right and his willful 
intent as to the charges of solicitation by a 
bribe.  Thus, the “other acts” evidence is 
being introduced for a proper evidentiary 
purpose and not as propensity evidence. . . .  
The Government intends to introduce other 
act evidence to develop examples of 
solicitations during the course of 
Defendant’s business transactions with 
various entities, and for which Defendant 
acted with the requisite corrupt intent and 
knowledge.  Likewise, the Government’s 
evidence of other solicitations is relevant 
under Rule 401 to establish necessary 
elements of the crimes charged in this case.  
The Government has presented a sufficient 
chain of inferences connecting these other 
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acts to material facts in this case without 
implicating the evidentiary rules’ prohibition 
of using propensity evidence.  Furthermore, 
this evidence satisfies the balancing 
requirements of Rule 403.  The other act 
evidence to be introduced by the 
Government is probative of facts in this case 
and that probative value is not substantially 
outweighed by any unfair prejudice.  
Finally, in accordance with the law on this 
issue, the Court will provide a limiting 
instruction as necessary. 
JA25–27. 
Repak challenges the sufficiency of the District 
Court’s Rule 404(b) analysis, arguing that (1) the District 
Court failed to properly explain how the uncharged acts 
of solicitation relate to a non-propensity purpose and (2) 
the District Court erred by not properly scrutinizing the 
evidence’s prejudicial effect vis-à-vis its probative value.  
We agree with Repak that the District Court’s analysis 
was lacking but conclude that, under a proper Rule 
404(b) analysis, the Government’s other-acts evidence 
was admissible.   
We proceed by critically analyzing each of the four 
steps in the methodological process for determining 




The Government and District Court satisfied step 
one of the applicable Rule 404(b) analysis, properly 
identifying a non-propensity purpose for introducing 
Repak’s other past solicitations—knowledge and intent.3  
See Brown, 765 F.3d at 291; Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276.  
The plain text of Rule 404(b) allows for the admission of 
other-acts evidence to show knowledge and intent as the 
Government proffered here.  See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) 
(noting that other-acts evidence may be admissible for 
proving “intent” and “knowledge”); see also United 
States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Evidence of prior bad acts may be admitted for the 
purpose of demonstrating the defendant’s knowledge in 
                                                 
3 The District Court did not address the Government’s 
suggestion that the other-acts evidence provides 
“background” for the case.  We have held that the use of 
other-acts evidence as “background” can be permissible, 
see, e.g., Green, 617 F.3d at 247, but have recently 
cautioned against overreliance on this purpose as a means 
for admitting other-acts evidence, see United States v. 
Steiner, 847 F.3d 103, No. 14-4628, 2017 WL 437657, at 
*4–6 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2017).  Because the District Court 
did not rely on the use of other-acts evidence as 
“background” and the evidence here properly showed 
Repak’s mental state, we need not address the propriety 
of the Government’s proposed “background” use. 
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the later offense with which he is charged.”).  Repak put 
his mental state at issue in this case.  His knowledge and 
intent are elements of the two charged offenses.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a); 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B); see also 
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992) 
(concluding that, to show extortion under the Hobbs Act, 
the Government must prove that a defendant obtained a 
payment “knowing that the payment was made in return 
for official acts”).  Repak contested those elements at 
trial, contending that he did not accept items from JRA 
contractors with the intention of influencing the awarding 
of JRA contracts.  Use of the uncharged solicitations to 
show Repak’s mental state was a proper non-propensity 
use of that evidence under Rule 404(b). 
2 
The Government and District Court, however, 
faltered at step two of the Rule 404(b) analysis.  Both 
failed to explain how the Government’s proffered 
evidence was relevant to Repak’s mental state.  See 
Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276 (other-acts evidence must be 
“relevant to [a non-propensity] purpose”).  Nonetheless, 
the admission of this evidence was proper because it was 
relevant to that non-propensity purpose. 
To be relevant, proffered evidence must fit into “a 
chain of inferences—a chain that connects the evidence 
to a proper purpose, no link of which is a forbidden 
propensity inference.”  United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 
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434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013).  “[T]his chain [must] be 
articulated with careful precision because, even when a 
non-propensity purpose is ‘at issue’ in a case, the 
evidence offered may be completely irrelevant to that 
purpose, or relevant only in an impermissible way.”  
Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 281. 
We have recently reiterated the importance of 
concretely connecting the proffered evidence to a non-
propensity purpose.  In United States v. Caldwell, we 
rejected the use of prior gun possession convictions to 
show a defendant’s knowledge that he actually possessed 
a gun.  Id. at 283.  Testimony at trial demonstrated that 
the defendant was seen carrying the gun, and yet the 
Government proceeded to introduce the defendant’s prior 
gun possession convictions to show his actual possession 
of the charged gun.  Id. at 279.  “Because the 
Government proceeded solely on a theory of actual 
possession,” we held that the defendant’s “knowledge 
was not at issue in the case.”  Id. (“[A]bsent unusual 
circumstances (such as when a defendant claims he did 
not realize the object in his hand was a gun), the 
knowledge element in a felon-in-possession case will 
necessarily be satisfied if the jury finds the defendant 
physically possessed the firearm.”).  We reached that 
conclusion because we could observe “no articulation by 
the Government of a logical chain of inferences showing 
how [the defendant’s] prior convictions [were] relevant to 
show [the non-propensity purpose of] knowledge.”  Id. at 
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281.  Rather, the Government there simply relied on ipse 
dixit, stating the “baseline position” that the evidence of 
the defendant’s prior gun convictions was “generally 
relevant” to show the defendant’s knowledge that he 
possessed the gun related to the charged offense.  Id.  
That baseline position told us “nothing about how the 
evidence” helped established the defendant’s knowledge.  
Id.  We further observed that the District Court in 
Caldwell “likewise failed to articulate how the disputed 
evidence tend[ed] to show that [the defendant] knowingly 
possessed the gun [related to the charged gun 
possession].”  Id.  In doing so, we “emphasize[d] that it is 
not enough to merely recite a Rule 404(b) purpose that is 
at issue; the Court must articulate how the evidence is 
probative of that purpose.”  Id. at 282.  In summary, 
Caldwell makes clear that a logical chain of inferences 
must be articulated so that we are “assure[d] that the 
evidence is not susceptible to being used improperly by 
the jury.”  Id. 
Similarly, in United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278 
(3d Cir. 2014), we rebuffed the Government’s efforts to 
introduce evidence of a defendant’s previous use of straw 
purchasers to buy guns to show that the defendant had 
knowledge that he was in a car with a gun.  Id. at 294.  
As in Caldwell, we began by noting the complete lack of 
an explanation by the Government for how its evidence 
was relevant to its proffered non-propensity purpose.  See 
id. at 293 (“The Government has completely failed to 
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explain how the fact that [the defendant] used a straw 
man in 2005 to purchase firearms tends to prove that he 
knowingly possessed the gun under the driver’s seat of 
the Impala six years later.  These are two entirely distinct 
acts, and participation in one has no relationship to the 
other.”).  The Government’s explanation was that the 
defendant’s prior use of a straw purchaser made it “more 
likely that he used . . . a straw purchaser to obtain the 
gun” he was charged with possessing.  Id.  That, we 
noted, was “too great a leap in logic” and “indubitably 
forged” the Government’s chain of inferences “with an 
impermissible propensity link.”  Id.  Critically, the 
District Court there also failed to explain sufficiently its 
basis for admitting the evidence.  The District Court 
stated simply that the Government could use the evidence 
“to show motive or knowledge and that type of thing 
along those lines.”  Id. at 294 (citations omitted).  We 
instructed that the District Court “should not merely 
inquire of the prosecution what it wishes the evidence to 
prove” but rather put the Government to the task of 
explaining how the evidence “should work in the mind of 
a juror to establish the fact the government claims to be 
trying to prove.”  Id. (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
The Government’s proffer and District Court’s 
explanation here fell short, failing to explain how 
evidence of uncharged solicitations would have a 
tendency to make Repak’s knowledge and intent more 
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probable in the mind of a juror.  The question is whether 
the evidence of other uncharged solicitations by Repak 
was relevant to show Repak’s mental state as to the 
charged conduct—solicitation of the roof and excavation 
services.  In its motion in limine, the Government merely 
stated, in cursory fashion, that Repak’s “prior course of 
conduct and business dealings/relationship with the 
named entities, including previous solicitations, [was] 
extremely relevant and [would] go directly to prove” 
Repak’s “knowledge” and “corrupt intent.”  JA125–26.  
As in Caldwell and Brown, the Government failed to 
articulate a chain of inferences supporting the admission 
of Repak’s uncharged solicitations.  Instead, the 
Government stated only that a logical chain connecting 
the evidence to a non-propensity purpose exists.  That 
statement is not enough to demonstrate the admissibility 
of Rule 404(b) evidence.  The District Court should have 
asked the Government to explain “how the proffered 
evidence should work in the mind of a juror to establish” 
Repak’s knowledge and intent related to the roof and 
excavation services.  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 282 (quoting 
United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 
2012)).   
The District Court’s analysis of the Rule 404(b) 
admission is also wanting.  As quoted above, the District 
Court observed, “Defendant’s business dealings with the 
various vendors, including other instances of solicitations 
that were not charged in the indictment in this case, are 
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relevant to showing a necessary element of the crimes 
charged in this case.”  JA26.  It added that “[t]he 
Government ha[d] presented a sufficient chain of 
inferences connecting these other acts to material facts in 
this case.”  JA27.  Like the Government’s explanation, 
this analysis is inexact and fails to adequately link the 
other-acts evidence to a non-propensity purpose with 
“careful precision.”  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 281; see also 
Brown, 765 F.3d at 294 (“When confronted with a 
proffer under Rule 404(b), a district court should not 
merely inquire of the prosecution what it wishes the 
evidence to prove.”).  In essence, this was the “mere 
recitation of the purposes in Rule 404(b)(2)” that we have 
previously deemed inadequate.  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 
277. 
Despite the inexact nature of the Government’s 
proffer and the District Court’s Rule 404(b) analysis, our 
review of the record leads us to conclude that the 
evidence of Repak’s uncharged solicitations was properly 
admitted to prove Repak’s mental state.  Although we 
strongly prefer that the Government and District Court 
provide the chain of inferences supporting the admission 
of other-acts evidence (as this Court has repeatedly 
required), we are able to discern that the chain exists 
here.  Repak repeatedly solicited and received items from 
JRA contractors at great cost to the contractors; the 
growing costs of these items to the JRA contractors tends 
to show that Repak knew that these items were not 
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unilateral token gifts; therefore, it is more likely that 
Repak knowingly and intentionally accepted the roof and 
excavating services with an understanding that those 
items were to influence the award of JRA contracts to 
those contractors.4  This chain of inferences did not 
require the jury to make “too great a leap in logic.”  
Brown, 765 F.3d at 293.   
That chain of inferences is not unfamiliar.  In 
United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 1993), we 
                                                 
4 The uncharged solicitations may also have been used to 
explicate Repak’s guilt by providing insight into the 
minds of the contractors Repak extorted: through 
Repak’s repeated demands for items, the JRA contractors 
came to believe that they would lose JRA work if they 
failed to acquiesce in his demands.  Testimony revealing 
the state of mind of an extortion victim is relevant in 
Hobbs Act cases.  See United States v. Stirone, 311 F.2d 
277, 280 (3d Cir. 1962) (“It is well settled that testimony 
showing the state of mind of the victim is permitted in 
Hobbs Act cases.”); see also United States v. Dozier, 672 
F.2d 531, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he victim’s fearful 
state of mind is a crucial element in proving extortion.” 
(quoting United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 845 (5th 
Cir. 1971))); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 513, 520 
(7th Cir. 1978) (“We believe that the state of mind 
testimony of the victims was admissible to show that the 
victims’ consent was induced by defendant’s office.”). 
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upheld the admission of other-acts evidence against two 
lawyers who conspired with a doctor to submit fraudulent 
medical bills to insurances companies.  Id. at 658–59.  
The other-acts evidence there showed that the lawyers 
also engaged in a similar scheme with doctors other than 
the doctor charged in the indictment.  Id.  We reasoned 
that the other-acts evidence “tended to support the 
finding that [the lawyers] knew [the] bills [related to the 
charged conduct] were fraudulent and that they 
intentionally submitted them to insurance companies as 
part of a broader plan to defraud insurance companies 
through fraudulent personal injury claims.”  Id. at 659.  
For that reason, we permitted admission of the evidence 
under Rule 404(b).   
In a recent similar case, we concluded that Rule 
404(b) allowed for the admission of evidence that a 
defendant—the Executive Director of the Legislature for 
the Virgin Islands—received a kickback bribe from a 
third party.  See United States v. Willis, 844 F.3d 155, 
169–70 (3d Cir. 2016).  Much like the present case, the 
Government alleged that the defendant received money 
from contractors in exchange for the defendant’s 
facilitating the award of certain renovation contracts to 
those same contractors.  Id. at 158.  The Government 
proffered other-acts evidence showing that, while he held 
a different government position, the defendant received 
money from an individual in exchange for lifting a lien 
on that individual’s bank account.  Id. at 169.  The 
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individual was one of the contractors connected to the 
charged conduct.  Id.  The purpose for introducing that 
proffered evidence was “to demonstrate that [the 
defendant] was not mistaken about the nature of the 
transactions involved in the . . . renovation and fully 
intended to accept bribes and commit extortion.”  Id. at 
169–70.  We determined that a “strong nexus” existed 
between the past bribe the defendant received and the 
charged conduct.  Id.  More specifically, the earlier bribe 
demonstrated that the charged payments from contractors 
“were not loans, that they were not gifts, and that [the 
defendant] intended to accept cash in exchange for 
handing out more government contract work.”  Id.   
Much like in Willis, the past solicitations here were 
closely related to the charged acts, and participation in 
one had a relationship to the other.  Cf. Brown, 765 F.3d 
at 293.  The Government’s evidence of uncharged 
solicitations demonstrated Repak’s course of conduct 
over a relatively circumscribed time period with the same 
actors involved in the charged conduct.  That evidence 
thus tends to show that Repak “intended to accept [the 
roof and excavating services] in exchange for handing 
out more government contract work.”  Willis, 844 F.3d at 
170.  The other-acts evidence makes it more likely that 
Repak did not “unwittingly” solicit and receive the roof 
and excavation services without knowing or intending 
that the services were meant to influence him in his role 
as the JRA’s Executive Director.  Vega, 285 F.3d at 262 
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(permitting use of Rule 404(b) evidence related to prior 
conspiracy to show that the defendant “did not 
unwittingly participate” in the charged crime).  
Therefore, while the Government and District Court 
failed to adequately connect the other-acts evidence to a 
non-propensity purpose, a more fulsome examination 
demonstrates that the evidence was relevant to prove 
Repak’s mental state. 
3 
The District Court’s analysis also fell short at step 
three of the Rule 404(b) analysis.  That third step requires 
that other-acts evidence must not give rise to a danger of 
unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence under Rule 403 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  See Brown, 765 F.3d at 291.  
Rule 403 states: “The court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”  Fed. R. 
Evid. 403.  Rule 403 “creates a presumption of 
admissibility.”  United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 
302 (3d Cir. 2014).  “Evidence cannot be excluded under 
Rule 403 merely because its unfairly prejudicial effect is 
greater than its probative value.  Rather, evidence can be 
kept out only if its unfairly prejudicial effect 
‘substantially outweigh[s]’ its probative value.”  United 
States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403).  
Nevertheless, district courts must undertake some 
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analysis, i.e., provide “meaningful balancing,” when 
applying Rule 403 to determine the admissibility of Rule 
404(b) evidence.  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 283.  “We will 
reverse where the Court’s reasoning ‘is not apparent from 
the record.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 725 
F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
The balancing (or lack thereof) performed in 
Caldwell is instructive.  In Caldwell, the District Court 
stated: “What I want to say is that not only are [the past 
convictions] admissible under 404(b), but because 
knowledge and intent are at issue here, they are more 
probative than prejudicial.  I find that the probative value 
outweighs any prejudicial effect as well as to their 
admissibility.”  Id. at 284.  That analysis, we concluded, 
offered “nothing more than a bare recitation of Rule 
403.”  Id.  The omission of any “meaningful evaluation” 
of the prejudicial effect of the Rule 404(b) evidence 
failed to ensure that the probative value of the evidence 
was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  
Id.   
The District Court’s analysis here is strikingly 
similar to the recitation of Rule 403 we determined to be 
inadequate in Caldwell.  The District Court stated simply 
that the other-acts evidence “satisfies the balancing 
requirements of Rule 403.”  JA27.  In the following 
sentence, the District Court simply reiterated its 
conclusion: “The other act evidence to be introduced by 
the Government is probative of facts in this case and that 
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probative value is not substantially outweighed by any 
unfair prejudice.”  Id.  Although the Government 
tendered its Rule 403 balancing when offering its 
evidence, the District Court needed to provide its own 
Rule 403 balancing before admitting the evidence.  An 
evaluation under Rule 403 is not meaningful if it merely 
states a bare conclusion.  More is required.  As the 
District Court failed to offer its own reasoning, the 
District Court’s balancing failed to provide “meaningful 
evaluation” of the Government’s evidence of Repak’s 
uncharged solicitations.  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 284.   
That said, it is “apparent from the record” that the 
prejudicial effect of the Government’s evidence does not 
substantially outweigh the probative value of that 
evidence.  Id.  The probative value of Repak’s past 
solicitations was significant.  See Willis, 844 F.3d at 170 
(upholding the admission of a past bribe as evidence 
tended to show that a government official did not 
perceive the bribe to be a loan or a gift); Vega, 285 F.3d 
at 262 (permitting use of Rule 404(b) evidence because 
that evidence tended to show that the defendant “did not 
unwittingly participate” in the charged crime); Console, 
13 F.3d at 659 (concluding that Rule 404(b) evidence 
was relevant to show defendants’ knowledge and intent 
regarding the charged conduct).  Moreover, Repak 
challenged the proof as to his knowledge and intent, 
making those elements of the charged offenses the 
centerpiece of the trial.  Cf. Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 283 
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(“[T]he probative value of prior act evidence is 
diminished where the defendant does not contest the fact 
for which supporting evidence has been offered.”).  
Repak himself concedes that this evidence played a key 
role at trial and likely contributed to the Government’s 
carrying its burden as to his mens rea.  See Reply Br. 16 
(“[A]t trial the Government repeatedly emphasized the 
404(b) evidence . . . .”).   
That compelling probative value is not 
substantially outweighed by any prejudice arising from 
the admission of the uncharged solicitations.  For one, as 
explained below, the District Court provided a limiting 
instruction, mitigating any concern that the jury would 
have used this evidence to draw a propensity inference.  
See infra.  We have no reason to believe the jury did not 
follow the limiting instruction.  See United States v. 
Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1147 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e 
presume that the jury will follow a curative instruction 
unless there is an ‘overwhelming probability’ that the 
jury will be unable to follow it and a strong likelihood 
that the effect of the evidence would be ‘devastating’ to 
the defendant.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted) (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 
(1987))).  Second, any prejudice here does not compare 
to the “heightened” prejudicial impact identified in 
Caldwell.  760 F.3d at 284.  There, we observed the 
“heightened” prejudice caused by the introduction of 
other-acts evidence when that evidence was “admitted in 
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the form of a prior criminal conviction, especially a prior 
conviction for the same crime as that being tried.”  Id.  In 
comparison, the Government here introduced other-acts 
evidence of Repak’s uncharged conduct.  Given that 
difference, the evidence of Repak’s uncharged conduct 
was simply not of the same prejudicial ilk as the identical 
past convictions introduced in Caldwell.    
The District Court’s application of Rule 403 to the 
Government’s other-acts evidence lacked the rigor this 
Court requires.  Yet in our application of proper Rule 403 
scrutiny, we conclude than any danger of unfair prejudice 
resulting from admission of Repak’s uncharged 
solicitations fails to substantially outweigh the probative 




Finally, the District Court dutifully performed the 
fourth step of the Rule 404(b) analysis, appropriately 
providing limiting instructions for the other-acts evidence 
as requested by Repak.  As we have held, the District 
Court must provide the jury with a limiting instruction, if 
requested, “advis[ing] the jury that the evidence is 
admissible for a limited purpose and may not be 
considered in another manner.”  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 
277; see also Brown, 765 F.3d at 291.  Here, the District 
Court provided two limiting instructions.  During the 
trial, the District Court advised the jury that:  
[t]his evidence of other acts, in other words, 
acts that are not charged in the indictment, 
was admitted only for limited purposes.  
You may only consider this evidence for the 
purpose of deciding whether the defendant 
had the state of mind, knowledge, or intent 
necessary to commit the crimes charged in 
the indictment. 
JA341–42.  At the close of the evidence, the District 
Court instructed, “[The] evidence of other acts was 
admitted for limited purposes.  You may consider this 
evidence only for the purpose of deciding whether the 
defendant had the knowledge or intent necessary to 
commit the crimes charged in the indictment.”  JA649–
50.  The District Court thus satisfied step four in 
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providing a limiting instruction on the jury’s use of the 
Rule 404(b) evidence. 
*** 
We agree with Repak that the Government and 
District Court failed to adequately explain the basis for 
admitting the other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b).  
Nevertheless, under a proper Rule 404(b) inquiry, the 
evidence of Repak’s uncharged solicitations was 
admissible. 
B 
Repak contends that the admission of evidence 
regarding his affair with his assistant, Debbie Walter, 
was an error under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  This Court reviews the District Court’s 
admission for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. 
Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 117 (3d Cir. 2016).   
As noted above, Rule 403 states: “The court may 
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair 
prejudice.”  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  We have observed:  
Rule 403 does not provide a shield for 
defendants who engage in outrageous acts, 
permitting only the crimes of Caspar 
Milquetoasts to be described fully to a jury.  
It does not generally require the government 
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to sanitize its case, to deflate its witnesses’ 
testimony, or to tell its story in a monotone. 
Cross, 308 F.3d at 325 (quoting United States v. 
Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).  Thus, 
a district court need only keep out evidence “if its 
unfairly prejudicial effect ‘substantially outweigh[s]’ its 
probative value.”  Id. at 323. 
In briefing before the District Court, Repak 
contended that his affair with Walter was “irrelevant to 
the charges in the Indictment or simply prejudicial.”  
JA77.  In response, the Government explained that the 
affair “put[] [Walter’s] actions and testimony into 
context,” “squarely addresse[d] facts at issue, i.e., 
whether or not solicitations and receipt of items occurred 
as charged,” and impacted Walter’s credibility.  JA152.  
The District Court ruled that, while prejudicial, evidence 
of the affair was also highly probative.  JA15.  According 
to the District Court, the affair was “relevant to the 
Government’s burden of showing Defendant’s mental 
state regarding the crimes charged.”  JA15.  As an 
example, the District Court observed that “witnesses will 
testify that solicitations by Defendant were made to 
benefit Walter because she was his paramour,” thus 
demonstrating a motive for certain solicitations.  Id.  It 
also accepted the Government’s argument that the affair 




Repak’s argument on appeal is two-fold but 
straightforward.  He contends that evidence of his affair 
was not relevant and that the prejudice created by its 
admission substantially outweighed whatever probative 
value that evidence has.  Repak’s arguments are 
ultimately unpersuasive.  The District Court reasonably 
exercised its discretion to admit the affair evidence.  See 
United States v. Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 
F.3d 657, 665 (3d Cir. 2000) (“If judicial self-restraint is 
ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial 
court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal.” (quoting 
United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 
1978))). 
The Government elicited testimony from multiple 
JRA contractors regarding requests for items coming 
directly from Walter.  See, e.g., JA327; JA374; JA384.  
Those contractors also testified that they would buy items 
for Walter at Repak’s request.  See, e.g., JA327.  One 
contractor affirmed that he had knowledge of the affair 
while the solicitations were occurring, and another knew 
that giving Walter items would make Repak happy.  
JA289–90; JA327.  For her part, Walter admitted that she 
had a romantic relationship with Repak.  JA406.  She 
also testified that she would occasionally email Repak’s 
requests for items to JRA contractors.  JA408.  She stated 
that she would make these requests because of “both” her 
business and personal relationship with Repak.  JA409.  
Finally, Repak himself admitted to the affair.  JA514–15. 
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Given this legal and factual background, the 
evidence of Repak’s affair was relevant.  See Fed. R. 
Evid. 401.  For one, testimony of the affair tended to 
show that Repak possessed the requisite mens rea when 
obtaining items from the JRA contractors.  More 
specifically, the evidence may have explained Repak’s 
motivation in making certain requests.  See, e.g., JA409–
10 (Walter testifying that she asked Repak to get tickets 
to a Tony Bennett performance).  Evidence of the affair 
may also have shown that Repak knew the items were 
given to Walter to please him and thereby garner 
contracts for the JRA contractors.  See JA327 (stating 
that items were provided for Walter because she “was 
Mr. Repak’s assistant and with him constantly and was 
involved with all their projects the same”); cf. United 
States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(permitting admission of evidence “describing 
[witnesses’] relationship to the defendants . . . to 
illustrate the witnesses’ role in the [criminal acts]”).  
Second, the affair evidence assisted the jury in assessing 
Walter’s credibility.  Her credibility was at issue when it 
came to her testimony about the requests she made for 
Repak, Repak’s views about the gratuities policy enacted 
by the JRA, and the reasons she was willing to help 
Repak make those requests.  As we have unequivocally 
held, “evidence concerning a witness’s credibility is 
always relevant, because credibility is always at issue.”  




While relevant, the affair evidence likely caused 
some prejudice to Repak.  The record, however, fails to 
demonstrate that that prejudice was unfair or that it 
substantially outweighed the evidence’s probative value.  
The affair evidence was hardly a main feature of the 
trial.5  The testimony outlined above constitutes the 
entirety of the testimony regarding the affair.  In short, 
trial testimony regarding the affair was not belabored; it 
simply advised the jury of the personal relationship 
between Repak and Walter for the permissible purposes 
mentioned above.   
Thus, given the probative value of the affair 
evidence and the limited nature of its prejudicial effect, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
that evidence.  See United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 
190 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing that district courts are 
owed “substantial deference . . . in weighing evidence 
under Rule 403”). 
C 
Repak next challenges the sufficiency of the trial 
evidence underlying his convictions.  “We exercise 
                                                 
5 Repak argues that comments about his affair made by 
the Government attorney during closing arguments also 
prejudiced him.  That argument is better framed as a 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct, and we address it 
below in that context. 
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plenary review over a district court’s grant or denial of a 
motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency 
of the evidence, applying the same standard as the district 
court.”  Starnes, 583 F.3d at 206.  “In reviewing a jury 
verdict for sufficiency of the evidence . . . [,] we must 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government and affirm the judgment if there is 
substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact 
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United 
States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 204 (3d Cir. 2005)).  
This standard is “highly deferential.”  United States v. 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(en banc).  We “must be ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the 
role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning 
weight to the evidence, or by substituting [our] judgment 
for that of the jury.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 
2005)). 
1 
Repak makes two arguments against his 
convictions on Counts 3 and 5, charging violations of the 
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951.  First, Repak contends that 
there is no evidence he received the roof and excavation 
services for his agreement to influence official acts.  
Second, Repak maintains that the award of JRA contracts 
is not an “official act” under § 1951 as interpreted by the 
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Supreme Court in McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2355 (2016).  We conclude that the trial evidence was 
sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find Repak 
guilty of both counts beyond a reasonable doubt. 
i 
Repak’s contention that there is no evidence of an 
“agreement” to influence official JRA actions is wrong 
on the law and contrary to the record.  When proving a 
violation of § 1951, the Government does “not have to 
show the defendant[] had an express agreement.”  United 
States v. Bradley, 173 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 1999).  
“[T]he Government need only show that a public official 
has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, 
knowing that the payment was made in return for official 
acts.”  Evans, 504 U.S. at 268.  Put differently, “it is 
sufficient if the public official understands that he is 
expected, as a result of the payment, to exercise 
particular kinds of influence or to do certain things 
connected with his office as specific opportunities arise.”  
Bradley, 173 F.3d at 231 (quoting jury instructions).  The 
instructions the District Court provided to the jury here 
mirrored the language from that case law:  
The government is not required to prove an 
explicit promise to perform the official acts 
in return for the payment.  Passive 
acceptance of a benefit by a public official is 
a sufficient basis for this type of extortion if 
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the official knows that he is being offered 
payment in exchange for his ability to do 
official acts. 
JA657–58.  Therefore, Repak’s contention that the 
Government failed to demonstrate an “agreement” is 
unpersuasive. 
While the Government need not show an 
agreement, it does need to demonstrate Repak’s 
acceptance of the roof and excavating services knowing 
that they were given in exchange for his influencing the 
award of JRA contracts.  Rarely will the sort of 
knowledge the Government charged Repak with be 
reflected in a written agreement, nor does the 
Government need to produce such a document.  See 
Bradley, 173 F.3d at 231.  Rather, the Government need 
only rely on circumstantial evidence.  Id. at 232.  The 
Government did so here. 
At trial, JRA contractors testified to the “unspoken 
understanding” between themselves and Repak.  JA333.  
Explaining why EADS provided Repak with free 
services, EADS employee Stephen Sewalk testified: “[I]f 
we didn’t [follow Repak’s instructions], I felt that we 
would lose work.”  JA284.  That view was based on more 
than intuition.  Repak would tell Sewalk, “‘Hey, I’m 
reviewing some invoice here of yours,’ which [was] 
usually followed up with some type of request.”  Id.; see 
also JA289 (recalling that Repak would threaten that he 
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would find “someone else” who would be willing to 
fulfill his demands); JA301 (“Mr. Repak provided a lot 
of, I said innuendos, subtle things throughout 
conversations.  And then it would always be followed in 
a short period of time by either an instruction or request. 
. . .  [W]ith him[,] [instructions and requests] were the 
same thing.”).  L&M employee Rick McNulty similarly 
explained that providing free services and items to Repak 
was simply “part of doing business with the [JRA] and 
Mr. Repak.”  JA311.  He reached this conclusion 
following messages from Repak telling McNulty that 
Repak “need[ed]” certain items from L&M and follow-
up calls from Repak to McNulty asking why items had 
not yet been provided.  JA311, JA317.  Putting a finer 
point on his testimony, McNulty stated that he knew that 
if he didn’t provide those services, “it would be a 
problem from a work aspect.”  JA312. 
As the old adage goes, “actions often speak louder 
than words.”  Here, the actions of the JRA contractors 
spoke volumes about their understanding with Repak.  
EADS provided Repak with a new roof, bearing $3,000 
to $4,000 in costs.  JA287–88; JA315–16.  After 
receiving the new roof, Repak told Sewalk to bury EADS 
expenses in an invoice to the JRA.  JA299–300.  Sewalk 
testified that he knew his company would not get more 
work from the JRA if it required Repak to pay for his 
roof.  JA289.  Similarly, L&M provided Repak with 
excavating services for his son’s gym, at a cost of 
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$17,500 to L&M.  JA325–26.  Echoing Sewalk’s 
testimony, McNulty stated that when he asked Repak 
who he should invoice for the excavating services, Repak 
told him to “just bury it in invoices” to the JRA.  JA326.  
This evidence was more than sufficient to show that 
Repak obtained the roof and excavating services, 
“knowing that the payment was made in return for 
official acts.”  Evans, 504 U.S. at 268. 
Viewing that evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Government, a rational jury could have convicted 
Repak of the Hobbs Act charges.  See Bradley, 173 F.3d 
at 231 (observing that “knowing winks and nods” 
demonstrating a mutual understanding with a public 
official was sufficient for conviction under § 1951 
(quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment))). 
ii 
Repak’s second contention regarding Counts 3 and 
5, relying on McDonnell v. United States, is equally 
unpersuasive.   
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court vacated 
convictions under § 1951 because jury instructions in that 
case improperly defined “official act.”  136 S. Ct. at 
2373.  Pursuant to § 1951, a criminal offense occurs 
when an individual “obstructs, delays, or affects 
commerce . . . by extortion,” with extortion defined as 
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“the obtaining of property of another, with his consent, 
. . . under color of official right.”  18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), 
(b).  The parties in McDonnell agreed that “extortion 
under color of official right” under § 1951 included the 
element of obtaining property knowing the property “was 
given in return for official action.”  136 S. Ct. at 2365.  
The parties further agreed that “official action” should be 
given the same meaning those words have in the federal 
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).  Id.   
Section 201(a)(3) of the federal bribery statute 
defines an “official act” as “any decision or action on any 
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, 
which may at any time be pending, or which may by law 
be brought before any public official, in such official’s 
official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or 
profit.”  18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).  The Supreme Court held 
that proving an “official act” requires a two-part 
showing.  McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368.   
“First, the Government must identify a ‘question, 
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ that ‘may 
at any time be pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ 
before a public official.”  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201(a)(3)).  The Supreme Court made two key 
clarifications as to this required showing.  First, the Court 
defined a “question” or “matter” as “similar in nature to a 
cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy.”  Id. at 2369.  
The Court further clarified that the “question” or 
“matter” must “involve a formal exercise of 
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governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit 
before a court, a determination before an agency, or a 
hearing before a committee.”  Id. at 2372.  Second, the 
Court observed that the “question” or “matter” must also 
be “something specific and focused that is ‘pending’ or 
‘may by law be brought.’”  Id.  It described a “question” 
or “matter” that is “pending” as “something that is 
relatively circumscribed—the kind of thing that can be 
put on an agenda, tracked for progress, and then checked 
off as complete.”  Id. at 2369. 
The second part of the showing to prove an 
“official act” requires the Government to “demonstrate 
that the public official made a decision or took an action 
‘on’ that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or 
controversy, or agreed to do so.”  Id. at 2368.  Providing 
some contour to that requirement, the Court observed that 
“if a public official uses his official position to provide 
advice to another official, knowing or intending that such 
advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by another 
official, that too can qualify as a decision or action.”  Id. 
at 2370.  By way of example, the Court noted that “a 
decision or action to initiate a research study” would 
sufficiently constitute a decision or action “on” a 
question or matter.  Id.; cf. United States v. Sun-Diamond 
Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 407 (1999) (observing 
that the hosting of a championship sports team by the 




As in McDonnell, the parties here agreed to 
instructions, read to the jury, which defined “extortion 
under color of official right” to mean “that a public 
official induced, obtained, accepted, or agreed to accept a 
payment to which he or she was not entitled, knowing 
that the payment was made in return for taking, 
withholding, or influencing official acts.”  JA657 
(emphasis added).  The instructions also required that the 
official acts be “pending before a government agency.”  
JA658.  The parties do not dispute that the definition of 
“official acts” comes from § 201(a)(3) of the federal 
bribery statute. 
Repak insists that the trial evidence of his 
facilitating the award of JRA contracts failed to 
demonstrate an “official act,” as defined in McDonnell, 
because that evidence did not demonstrate (1) a 
“question” or “matter” akin to “a lawsuit before a court, a 
determination before an agency, or a hearing before a 
committee” and (2) “something specific and focused that 
is ‘pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public 
official.”  136 S. Ct. at 2368, 2372. 
Repak’s first McDonnell argument is off the mark.  
The awarding of a JRA contract is not only akin to an 
agency determination—it is an agency determination.  
The Supreme Court in McDonnell concluded that a 
“Revitalization Commission’s” allocation of grant money 
was not only a sufficiently “focused and concrete” matter 
but also “involve[d] a formal exercise of governmental 
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power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit, administrative 
determination, or hearing.”  Id. at 2370.  As in 
McDonnell, a decision by the JRA—a governmental 
agency—to award money to contractors as part of its 
public mission to develop Johnstown’s infrastructure is 
undoubtedly the “formal exercise of governmental 
power.”  Id. at 2372.  It is, plainly, an agency 
determination.   
Repak’s second McDonnell argument, that the 
award of JRA contracts is not a “specific and focused 
[question or matter] that is ‘pending,’” is likewise 
unpersuasive.  Id.  In McDonnell, the Government argued 
that the focus of an event hosted by the defendant was 
“economic development” and that “economic 
development” was sufficiently narrow under § 201(a)(3).  
Id. 2368–69.  The Supreme Court in McDonnell, 
however, concluded that “economic development” is not 
specific and focused.  Id. at 2374.  In doing so, the Court 
reasoned that “economic development is not naturally 
described as a matter ‘pending’ . . . any more than 
‘justice’ is pending or may be brought by law before a 
judge, or ‘national security’ is pending or may be brought 
by law before an officer of the Armed Forces.”  Id. at 
2369.  It noted, though, that a “Revitalization 
Commission’s” decision to allocate grant money would 
be a “focused and concrete” matter.  Id. at 2370.   
In the language of McDonnell, the award of JRA 
contracts is “specific and focused.”  It is a concrete 
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determination made by the JRA’s Board of Directors and 
“the kind of thing that can be put on an agenda, tracked 
for progress, and then checked off as complete.”  Id. at 
2369.  It is “something within the specific duties of an 
official’s position—the function conferred by the 
authority of his office.”  Id.  The JRA and its Board of 
Directors were undisputedly tasked with the 
responsibility of awarding contracts.  The JRA received 
federal funds and, among other obligations, was 
“responsible to distribute those funds, . . . to provide for 
the engineering, [and] procurement of construction” 
related to redevelopment projects.  JA491.  As part of 
that process, and in his capacity as JRA Executive 
Director, Repak made recommendations to the JRA 
Board of Directors as to which contractors should be 
used on specific projects.  JA507.  The assigning of 
contractors to JRA projects can thus “naturally [be] 
described” as a matter “pending” before the JRA, unlike 
the nebulous issue of “economic development” in 
McDonnell.  136 S. Ct. at 2369.   
Implicit in both of Repak’s arguments under 
McDonnell is the suggestion that the facilitation of the 
award of those contracts is not a decision or action “on” a 
question or matter.  The Supreme Court held in 
McDonnell that an action “on” a question or matter 
includes a public official’s use of his position “to exert 
pressure on another official or provide advice, knowing 
or intending [that] such advice . . . form the basis for an 
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‘official act.’”  Id. at 2371.  As demonstrated by the 
record here, Repak had the power to, and indeed did, 
make recommendations to the JRA as to the contractors it 
hired for projects.  JA507.  The evidence was sufficient 
for the jury to conclude that he accepted the roof and 
excavating services knowing that he was to use his 
power, i.e., the ability to provide advice, to influence the 
JRA’s awarding of contracts. 
Therefore, the facilitation of the award of JRA 
contracts is an “official act” as defined by McDonnell. 
Evidence of Repak’s receipt of items knowing he was to 
facilitate the award of those contracts provided a 
sufficient basis for a rational trier of fact to convict him 
of the Hobbs Act charges under Counts 3 and 5.   
2 
As to Counts 4 and 6 related to 18 U.S.C. § 666, 
Repak argues that the trial evidence insufficiently 
demonstrated that he possessed the “corrupt” intent to be 
influenced by the roof and excavating services he 
received.  Again, Repak is incorrect.  A rational trier of 
fact could find the requisite intent beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
As outlined above, the JRA contractors testified to 
an unspoken but certain understanding between 
themselves and Repak under which they would provide 
Repak with items of value (usually items he specifically 
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requested) and Repak would influence the award of JRA 
contracts.  The statements attributed to Repak at trial 
repeatedly suggested as much, and his continued receipt 
of items from those contractors further demonstrated that 
he intended for such items—the costs for which he 
instructed be buried in JRA invoices—to influence the 
award of JRA contracts to those contractors.  In sum, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Government, the record demonstrates more than enough 
evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Repak possessed the requisite 
intent to convict him on the § 666 charges.  Cf. United 
States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 529–30 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(concluding that the trial evidence sufficiently 
demonstrated the defendant’s intent to have a public 
official influence government action under § 666). 
D 
Repak also argues that the District Court provided 
the jury with erroneous instructions.  More precisely, he 
contends that the instructions related to the Hobbs Act 
(Counts 3 and 5) and the federal program bribery statute 
(Counts 4 and 6) failed to properly advise the jury of the 
elements of the offenses charged.  The parties agree that 
plain error review applies.  See United States v. 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1260 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“Where a party has not made a clear, specific objection 
to the charge that he alleges is erroneous at trial, he 
waives the issue on appeal ‘unless the error was so 
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fundamental and highly prejudicial as to constitute plain 
error.’” (quoting Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d 
Cir. 1987))).  “[B]efore an appellate court can correct an 
error not raised at trial, there must be (1) ‘error,’ (2) that 
is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affects substantial rights.’”  
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997) 
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 
(1993)).  “[A]n error affects substantial rights when ‘it 
affected the outcome of the [lower] court proceedings.’”  
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Mills, 821 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 
2016) (second alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010)).  “It is a rare 
case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal 
of a criminal conviction when no objection has been 
made in the trial court.”  United States v. DiSalvo, 34 
F.3d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Henderson v. 
Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)).   
Although Repak fails to state the underlying legal 
basis for his jury instruction challenge, we have held:  
Due process requires that the Government 
prove every element of the charged offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, 
jury instructions that relieve the Government 
of this burden violate a defendant’s due 
process rights.  Carella v. California, 491 
U.S. 263, 265 (1989).  The inquiry is 
whether the court’s instruction constituted a 
mandatory presumption by “directly 
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foreclos[ing] independent jury consideration 
of whether the facts proved established 
certain elements of the offense with which 
[the defendant] was charged.”  Id. at 266. 
United States v. Korey, 472 F.3d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citation omitted).  In making this inquiry, the “[j]ury 
instructions must be read as a whole.”  United States v. 
Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 157 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting EEOC 
v. Del. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 865 F.2d 1408, 
1418 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Jury instructions satisfy due 
process if “the charge as a whole fairly and adequately 
submits the issues in the case to the jury.”  United States 
v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1264). 
1 
Repak first challenges the instructions associated 
with Counts 3 and 5, which charged violations of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951.  In relevant part, the jury instructions 
read:  
Count 3 of the indictment charges that . . . 
Repak[] did knowingly obstruct, delay, and 
affect commerce and the movement of 
articles and commodities in commerce by 
extortion, as those terms are defined in [18 
U.S.C. § 1951].  That is, [Repak], while 
executive director of the [JRA] engaged in a 
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course of conduct whereby [he] solicited and 
obtained from [EADS], with [EADS’] 
consent, a new roof on the personal 
residence of [Repak], . . . which was not due 
to him or his office and to which he was not 
entitled, in exchange for [his] official action 
and influence as the executive director of the 
[JRA], to facilitate the award of [JRA] 
contracting work to [EADS], all under color 
of official right and all in violation of [18 
U.S.C. § 1951]. 
. . . 
Count 5 of the indictment charges that . . . 
Repak did knowingly obstruct, delay, and 
affect commerce and the movement of 
articles and commodities in commerce by 
extortion, as those terms are defined in [18 
U.S.C. § 1951].  That is, [Repak], while 
executive director of the [JRA] engaged in a 
course of conduct whereby [he] solicited and 
obtained from [L&M], with [L&M’s] 
consent, building demolition and grading 
services at Evolution Gym, . . . which was 
not due to him or his office and to which he 
was not entitled, in exchange for [his] 
official action and influence as the executive 
director of the [JRA], to facilitate the award 
of [JRA] contracting work to [L&M], all 
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under color of official right and all in 
violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1951]. 
JA652–55.  The instructions then state that an element of 
§ 1951 is that the defendant did “knowingly and willfully 
by extortion under color of official right” obtain property 
from the JRA contractors.  JA656.  The instructions go 
on to define “extortion under color of official right,” 
defining the phrase to mean “that a public official 
induced, obtained, accepted, or agreed to accept a 
payment to which he or she was not entitled, knowing 
that the payment was made in return for taking, 
withholding, or influencing official acts.”  JA657. 
Repak advances two arguments regarding those 
instructions.  First, he contends that the jury instructions 
allowed the jury to convict him for any “official acts,” 
without limiting the focus to only his facilitation of the 
award of JRA contracts.  Second, he argues that even if 
the indictment did not broaden the allowable “official 
acts” of which he could be convicted, the District Court 
failed to inform the jury that it must determine whether 
the facilitation of the award of JRA contracts is an 
official act.  Neither argument carries the day. 
As to Repak’s first argument, he fails to identify 
any other “official act” on which he could have been 
convicted, and, in doing so, fails to explain how he could 
have been convicted of “official acts” other than his 
facilitation of the award of JRA contracts.  And review of 
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the record reveals no other “official act” evidence 
presented by the Government.  Indeed, the Government’s 
only theory at trial was that Repak accepted the roof and 
excavating services knowing that he was expected to 
facilitate the award of JRA contracts to EADS and L&M.   
Repak’s second challenge to the § 1951 
instructions fares no better.  The District Court’s 
instructions charged the jury with how it might find that 
Repak committed “extortion under color of official right” 
and defined that extortion to include the “influencing [of] 
official acts.”  JA657.  The instructions go even further 
by identifying the “official act” as “facilitat[ing] the 
award of [JRA] contracting work.”  JA652–55.  Thus, 
contrary to Repak’s contention, the instructions were 
sufficient in requiring the jury to determine whether the 
facilitation of the award of JRA contracts constituted an 
“official act.” 
Reading the jury instructions as a whole, we 
believe those instructions “fairly and adequately 
submit[ed]” to the jury the issue of whether facilitating 
the award of JRA contracts constituted an “official act.”  
Thayer, 201 F.3d at 221. 
2 
With regard to Counts 4 and 6, which charged 
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 666, Repak again argues that 
the jury instructions broadened the conduct that he could 
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be convicted of, beyond just the facilitation of the award 
of JRA contracts.  He specifically takes issue with the 
following language from the instructions: “The fourth 
element the government must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt is that [Repak] accepted or agreed to accept, or 
solicited something of value corruptly, and with the 
intent to be influenced or rewarded in connection with 
some business or transaction of the [JRA].”  JA662 
(emphasis added).  According to Repak, that instruction 
permitted the jury to convict him of influencing any JRA 
“business or transaction,” not merely the award of JRA 
contracts.   
Reading those instructions as a whole, we 
conclude that the instructions did not violate Repak’s due 
process rights.  In summarizing the charges against 
Repak, the District Court stated: 
Count 4 of the indictment charges that . . . 
[Repak] did corruptly solicit, demand, 
accept, and agree to accept something of 
value, intending to be influenced and 
rewarded in connection with the business 
transaction and series of transactions of the 
[JRA] . . . .  That is, [Repak] solicited and 
obtained a new roof on his personal 
residence in exchange for his official actions 
and influence as the executive director of the 
[JRA], to facilitate the award of contracting 
work to [EADS]. 
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. . . 
Count 6 of the indictment charges that . . . 
[Repak] did corruptly solicit, demand, 
accept, and agree to accept something of 
value, intending to be influenced and 
rewarded in connection with the business 
transaction and series of transactions of the 
[JRA] . . . .  That is, [Repak] solicited and 
obtained building demolition and grading 
services at [his son’s gym] in exchange for 
his official actions and influence as the 
executive director of the [JRA], to facilitate 
the award of contracting work to [L&M]. 
JA653–56.  Those instructions thus specifically identify 
the “business or transaction” the Government charged 
Repak with influencing: “the award of [JRA] contracting 
work.”  Id.  Moreover, as with the charges under § 1951, 
Repak fails to identify any other JRA “business or 
transactions” in the trial evidence that could have 
supported a conviction.  Again, the Government’s only 
theory at trial was that Repak received a roof and 
excavating services from EADS and L&M, respectively, 
to facilitate the grant of JRA contracts.  The instructions 
related to § 666, therefore, “as a whole fairly and 
adequately submit[ed] the issues in the case to the jury.”  
Thayer, 201 F.3d at 221 (quoting Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 




Repak also asserts that reversal is called for 
because the indictment charging him was constructively 
amended.  “We exercise plenary review in determining 
whether there was a constructive amendment of the 
indictment,” but, “inasmuch as [Repak] did not raise the 
constructive amendment . . . in the district court we . . . 
consider [the issue] on a plain error basis.”  United States 
v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2006).   
In United States v. Daraio, we described the 
circumstances under which constructive amendment of 
an indictment occurs:  
An indictment is constructively amended 
when, in the absence of a formal 
amendment, the evidence and jury 
instructions at trial modify essential terms of 
the charged offense in such a way that there 
is a substantial likelihood that the jury may 
have convicted the defendant for an offense 
differing from the offense the indictment 
returned by the grand jury actually charged. 
Id. at 259–60.  “The key inquiry is whether the defendant 
was convicted of the same conduct for which he was 
indicted.”  Id. at 260 (quoting United States v. Robles-
Vertiz, 155 F.3d 725, 729 (5th Cir. 1998)).  “If a 
defendant is convicted of the same offense that was 
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charged in the indictment, there is no constructive 
amendment.”  United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 
532 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Repackaging his earlier challenge to his jury 
instructions, Repak contends that his indictment was 
constructively amended such that he could have been 
convicted for facilitating any “official act” under the 
Hobbs Act, Counts 3 and 5, and influencing any JRA 
“business or transaction” under the federal program 
bribery statute, Counts 4 and 6.  Once again, Repak is 
wrong.  The jury convicted him for the same conduct for 
which he was indicted. 
In Daraio, we held that no constructive 
amendment of the indictment had occurred where the 
district court provided the jury with thorough instructions 
that tracked the language in the indictment.  445 F.3d at 
261.  The indictment in Daraio charged the defendant 
with a specific act of tax evasion, but the Government 
also introduced evidence of prior tax non-compliance.  
Id. at 260.  We nevertheless concluded that “the district 
court’s instructions ensured that the jury would convict 
[the defendant], if at all, for a crime based on conduct 
charged in the indictment.”  Id.  We based our decision 
on the “basic tenet of our jurisprudence that a jury is 
presumed to have followed the instructions the court 
gave it.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 
452, 462 (3d Cir. 2003)).  We also highlighted the district 
court’s limiting instructions, which instructed the jury 
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that those other actions of tax non-compliance were not 
charged in the indictment and could not be the basis for a 
conviction.  Id. at 261.  For those reasons, we concluded: 
“[T]he district court obviated the possibility of the 
indictment being constructively amended by issuing 
accurate and thorough jury instructions precluding the 
jury from convicting [the defendant] for any conduct 
other than that which the indictment charged.”  Id. 
Like in Daraio, Repak was convicted of the same 
conduct for which he was charged.  First, as with his 
challenge to the jury instructions, Repak points to no 
other “official act” or “transaction” for which he could 
have been convicted.  Second, as part of its jury charge, 
the District Court read each count in the indictment, 
which—as we noted above—identified the specific 
“official act” or “transaction” related to each count, i.e., 
the facilitation of “the award of [JRA] contracting work.”  
JA651–56.  Third, the District Court also instructed the 
jury multiple times that it was not to consider evidence of 
Repak’s uncharged solicitations for any reason other than 
to prove his mental state as to the crimes charged.  We 
presume, as we must, that the jury followed the District 
Court’s instructions.  Daraio, 445 F.3d at 260.  We 
therefore conclude that the District Court “thoroughly 
and accurately instructed the jury on the basic elements 
of [Repak’s charged offenses] and focused the jury’s 
attention on the conduct that the indictment charged.”  Id. 





Finally, Repak raises a due process claim based on 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments.  Because Repak did not preserve this claim 
through objections at trial, we review for plain error.  See 
Mills, 821 F.3d at 456.   
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
provides defendants with a right to a fair trial, which 
includes protection from prosecutorial misconduct.  See 
id.  “When confronted with a claim that a prosecutor’s 
remarks violated this right, we first determine whether 
those remarks constituted misconduct.”  Id.  “If so, we 
proceed to determine whether that misconduct ‘so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process . . . .’”  Id. (quoting 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).  
“Not all prosecutorial misconduct violates this right.”  
United States v. Liburd, 607 F.3d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Rather, we examine “the prosecutor’s offensive 
actions in context and in light of the entire trial, assessing 
the severity of the conduct, the effect of the curative 
instructions, and the quantum of evidence against the 
defendant.”  Lee, 612 F.3d at 194 (quoting Moore v. 
Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001)).  “[A] criminal 
conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a 
prosecutor’s comments standing alone, for the statements 
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or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing 
can it be determined whether the prosecutor’s conduct 
affected the fairness of the trial.”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 
(1985)); see also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 
(1987) (“To constitute a due process violation, the 
prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient 
significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right 
to a fair trial.” (internal quotations omitted)).   
Repak complains that four statements made by the 
Government attorney in her closing argument constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct producing an unfair trial.  We 
are not persuaded that any reversible error occurred.   
1 
Repak first points to statements regarding his affair 
with Walter.  The Government attorney argued, “Not 
only did Mr. Repak have Ms. Walter as his mistress, but 
he also dictated e-mails to her where in those e-mails he 
instructed what he wanted.”  JA603.  The prosecutor also 
stated: 
Speaking about how the rules don’t matter—
and by no means, am I or this Court the 
morality police, but it goes to show that the 
lines are blurred easily and rules are not 
followed easily with Mr. Repak.  He 
engaged in an extramarital affair with his 
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assistant for years.  His explanation was 
well, yes, it happened, but it was on and off.   
So I guess we can assume from that, I’m 
faithful to my wife.  I’m not faithful to my 
wife.  I’m faithful to my wife.  I’m not 
faithful to my wife.  Yet another example of 
the blurring of what is permissible, even in 
his personal life that you heard about.   
JA 609.  This line of argument was inappropriate, 
irrelevant to any issue at trial, and unnecessarily 
prejudicial.  No reasonable person could have heard these 
words and not have considered them a direct reference to 
Repak’s marital infidelity.  As such, the prosecutor’s 
suggestion was that Repak was dishonest.   
Nonetheless, we do not believe that these 
comments so tainted the trial as to violate Repak’s Fifth 
Amendment rights.  The District Court instructed the jury 
that the “statements and arguments of the lawyers for the 
parties” were not evidence the jury could consider.  
JA638; see also United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 
136 (3d Cir. 2012) (“These instructions were likewise an 
adequate response to the possibility that the improper 
commentary would lead the jury astray in its 
deliberations.”).  We again presume the jury followed the 
instructions they were given.  See Daraio, 445 F.3d at 
260.  Also, on rebuttal, the Government attorney 
retreated from her previous statements and instead 
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refocused the jury on the affair’s relevance in explaining 
both why Repak may have been asking for certain items 
and why Walter may have been involved in making 
solicitations.  JA629–30.  Finally, as we observed 
regarding Repak’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, “the jury was presented with ample evidence 
on which it could convict” Repak of the charged 
offenses.  Berrios, 676 F.3d at 136.  Considering the 
entire record, and taking into account the context in 
which the comments regarding Repak’s affair were 
made, the prosecutor’s improper remarks do not rise to 
the level of misconduct affecting the outcome of the trial. 
2 
Repak next states that the Government attorney 
referred during her closing to facts not in evidence.  The 
Government planned to introduce testimony from one of 
Repak’s employees, Debbie Kerr, regarding her 
involvement with Repak’s solicitations.  JA241–42.  One 
witness testified that Kerr had been the JRA’s secretary 
but was unavailable to testify because of a sudden 
hospitalization.  JA431–32, JA447–48.  Repak testified 
that Kerr “would initiate the calls to . . . vendors,” 
making requests for food items such as lunch trays.  
JA507–08.  During closing arguments, the Government 
attorney remarked: 
You will recall [Repak] testified and said, 
Kerr, the receptionist over at the JRA, would 
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call up and get contractors to deliver food 
trays.  Kerr was going to be a government 
witness, who unfortunately, as a result of a 
sensitive medical issue . . . couldn’t testify.  
And Mr. Repak comes in here and tells you 
that Kerr would call and solicit things from 
contractors to have food brought over to the 
JRA.   
JA609–10.   
Repak’s argument that this statement constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct is baseless.  Both the fact that 
Kerr would have been a government witness if not for 
her medical issue and Repak’s testimony regarding her 
actions were already a part of the record.  JA447–48; 
JA507–08.  Responding to Repak’s testimony, the 
prosecutor at most contextualized the fact that Repak had 
attempted to shift the responsibility for certain 
solicitations to someone who did not testify.  See Fahy v. 
Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 204 (3d Cir. 2008) (a prosecutor 
may attack a defendant’s credibility by “point[ing] out 
the inconsistencies” in his testimony).  That was fair 
comment, simply noting the self-serving nature of the 
defendant’s testimony.  It did not come close to 
prosecutorial misconduct.  See Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (noting that a prosecutor “may 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should 




Repak argues that the Government attorney 
improperly expressed her personal opinion regarding his 
guilt.  The expression of a prosecutor’s personal opinion 
about the guilt of a defendant creates a risk that the jury 
will “trust the Government’s judgment rather than its 
own view of the evidence.”  United States v. Young, 470 
U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985).  In relevant part, the prosecutor 
stated: “We clearly, without a doubt, met what we 
need[ed] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to you.”  
JA629.  Repak’s argument about this comment is 
unavailing. 
As an initial matter, the attorney’s statement 
cannot be fairly characterized as a “personal” opinion.  
The attorney simply stated, using the first person plural, 
that the Government considered its burden of proof to 
have been met.  See United States v. Sherrill, 388 F.3d 
535, 538 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the statement, “that 
man is guilty,” was not improper because phrase was 
prefaced by “the government submits to you” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. 
Werme, 939 F.2d 108, 117 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The 
prosecutor is entitled to considerable latitude in 
summation to argue the evidence and any reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.”); cf. 
United States v. Andujar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549, 560–61 
(1st Cir. 2007) (observing that prosecutor’s statement 
that “I have proven [the defendant’s guilt], absolutely,” 
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was improper but did not necessitate a new trial).  
Moreover, focusing on the statement in context, we 
conclude that the prosecutor was responding to defense 
counsel’s argument that the Government had failed to 
show certain elements of the charged offenses.  See 
JA628–29.  The prosecutor merely replied that the 
Government had put forth evidence to satisfy those 
elements.  JA629.  Thus, at best, “[t]he statement was 
merely an alternative—albeit less than desirable—form 
of arguing to the jury that the evidence adduced [as to 
those elements] proved [Repak’s] guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 
1235, 1240 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also United 
States v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1194 
(3d Cir. 1984) (“By tying his remarks to evidence on the 
record, the prosecutor’s remarks were not prejudicial.” 
(citation omitted)).  The Government attorney’s 
statement was not an impermissible personal expression 
of Repak’s guilt.   
4 
Finally, Repak takes issue with the following 
statement by the Government attorney: 
In closing the defense talked about, Well, 
thank you.  Look what has happened to 
Johnstown, because now with Mr. Repak not 
here anymore, . . . Johnstown is now just 
going to go away.   
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Well remember, three things even had to be 
put in place before he even left [the JRA] 
because of the [way] he was carrying on 
business. . . .  I ask you to convict him on 
this, and that is the best thank you that 
Johnstown can receive.   
JA632.  Repak contends the Government attorney 
improperly asked the jury to send a message to the 
community by convicting him.  Although we consider the 
prosecutor’s “thank you” comment to have been, at least, 
an unnecessary rhetorical flourish, it was not 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
“There is no per se rule against invitations to a jury 
to ‘send a message.’”  United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 
312, 339 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Greenleaf v. Garlock, 
Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 364 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1999)).  In the 
context of a “send the message” comment, we have 
observed that “[t]he type of counsel misconduct that 
warrants granting a new trial is not generally a single 
isolated inappropriate comment, but rather repeated 
conduct.”  Id.  The Government attorney here acted in 
response to defense counsel’s suggestion that the jury 
should thank Repak for what he had done for Johnstown, 
see JA626 (“[Repak] was one of the best in the state at 
getting funds.  You heard where it is now.”), so “the 
prosecution was only meeting the defense on a level of 
the defense’s own choosing,” United States v. Lore, 430 
F.3d 190, 214 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
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LaSorsa, 480 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1973)).  Given the 
lack of a per se rule prohibiting this type of comment, the 
isolated nature of the comment, and defense counsel’s 
invitation to such comment, the prosecutor’s remark was 
innocuous. 
IV 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.  
 
